In June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s “knock-and-announce” rule may be admissible in a court of law. In a 5-4 decision, the court noted that the interests protected under the “exclusionary rule” differ from the interests protected by the “knock-and-announce” rule. Because the latter rule applies to evidence obtained with a search warrant, it is not necessarily held to the same standards of the “exclusionary rule,” which pertains to warrantless searches.
In August 1998, police entered the home of Booker Hudson Jr. with a search warrant for drugs. After finding crack cocaine and a gun, police arrested Hudson, who was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and illegal firearm possession.
Hudson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the officers ignored the knock-and-announce procedure. The knock-and-announce rule requires police officers to knock, announce their presence, then wait a period of time before entering the home.
Hudson’s motion to suppress was granted by the trial judge because the officers failed to knock, and then they waited only three to five seconds after announcing themselves as police officers before entering. Three years later, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the order to suppress, based on two cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court that had created an exception to suppression of evidence.
In People v. Stevens, the court held that the police were acting under a valid search warrant, and even though the method of entry into the dwelling violated the knock-and-announce rule, the evidence inevitably would have been discovered. In People v. Vasquez, the court found, “As in Stevens, suppression of the evidence is not the appropriate remedy in this case, even if there was a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement.”
The inevitable discovery doctrine asks the judge to determine whether the evidence obtained through the illegal search would have ultimately been uncovered had the police acted legally. The reason for suppression of evidence is to prevent illegal search and seizures from giving more of an advantage to the prosecution than it would have had if the search had been legal.
The Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule provides for the suppression of evidence that is illegally obtained and was first established in Weeks v. United States (1914). In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), this federal constitutional protection was extended to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The exclusionary rule consists of three components, 1) there must be an illegal action by a police officer, 2) evidence must be seized, and 3) there must be a causal relationship between the first two components. If it cannot be proved that the illegal action led to the procurement of the evidence, the exclusionary rule does not apply. If a causal relationship can be made, the defense may file a motion to suppress.
However, three exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. With the Independent Source Doctrine, evidence initially obtained without a search warrant but later re-obtained with a warrant is admissible. Segura and Colon v. U.S. (1984). With the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine, evidence obtained illegally is still admissible if that evidence would eventually have been recovered. Nix v. Williams (1984).
With the Good Faith Exception, evidence seized with a search warrant that was issued in error by a magistrate (unbeknownst to the police officer), can be admitted because the officer acted in “good faith”. U.S. v. Leon and Mass. v. Sheppard (1984).
Knock-and-Announce
A potential consequence of Hudson v. Michigan is abuse of the knock-and-announce rule on the part of law enforcement. Criminal justice experts claim that it is unreasonable to impose a set and specific length of time before entering a suspect’s home. Because the length of time before entry is frequently contingent upon the circumstances, each case is unique and should be handled accordingly.
Two knock-and-announce issues that come into play are the presence of exigent circumstances and what is meant by a “significant amount of time.” The knock-and-announce statute is broken down into four basic categories:
First, exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, allowing entry simultaneous to or shortly after announcement. Second, exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by destruction of property is required. Third, no exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, requiring an explicit refusal of admittance or significant lapse of time. Fourth, no exigent circumstances exist and forcible entry by destruction of property is required, mandating an explicit refusal of admittance or even more significant lapse of time.
According to U.S. v. McConney (1984), exigent circumstances exist if there is a possibility that the occupants may flee, destroy evidence within or harm someone. If the police officer can prove that exigent circumstances existed, the amount of time he or she waited before entering is inconsequential. In U.S. v. Granville (2000), the Ninth Circuit Court held that five seconds could not be considered a “significant amount of time” because it did not allow the suspect enough time to determine who was at the door.
However, several years later, the First Circuit Court concluded that “five seconds between the officer’s knock and announcement and a forced entry into an apartment was reasonable based on a threat to the safety of the officer” (U.S. v. Sargent, 2003). These rulings emphasize the importance of weighing the individual circumstances that affect the execution of a search warrant.
In his majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia rejects the exclusionary rule as a safeguard against illegal searches. If police officers perform an illegal search, causing property damage in the process, the only protection the exclusionary rule affords the violated people is the inadmissibility of the gathered evidence. The officers receive no punishment, and the inhabitants of the entered house receive no compensation for damages.
Scalia also believes that the exclusionary rule can lead to other problems. Police officers may be encouraged to lie in order to cover up errors made during a search, fearing the evidence they obtained illegally might be dismissed. He expresses doubt that abuse of the knock-and-announce rule will occur because citizens have the option of civil rights litigation as an effective way to seek compensation.
In Daran v. Eckold, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, who was awarded $2 million. Responding to an anonymous tip that the suspect’s house was a methamphetamine lab, police officers forced their way into the residence unannounced. After reviewing the case, the court held that the circumstances did not justify a violation of the knock-and-announce rule. The plaintiff, who was shot during the search and seizure, also brought suit against the police department for failing to train officers.
Law enforcement may view the court’s decision in Hudson v. Michigan as carte blanche to dismiss the knock-and-announce rule, forcing people whose rights have been violated to follow Justice Scalia’s advice and seek justice through litigation.
By weakening the knock-and-announce requirement, has the court essentially removed the impetus for law enforcement to honor its guidelines? Not necessarily. Even before Hudson v. Michigan, police officers could enter without knocking if they reasonably believed they would be placing themselves or others in danger by doing so. This “apprehension of peril exception” is generally upheld by the courts, providing a criminal justice “loophole” similar to inevitable discovery and the exclusionary rule.
Justice Scalia’s advocacy of civil litigation may also serve as a legal deterrent for police management and their subordinates. Fourth Amendment rights that are violated by federal officers may produce civil suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section1983. Because awards for this type of violation can carry heavy punitive damages, it is difficult to ignore the implications.
In addition, police managers can be held accountable for the mistakes of their officers. In Canton v. Hank, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the court stated, “Failure to teach and enforce constitutional requirements exposes municipalities to financial liability.” It is in the best interest of law enforcement agencies to reiterate the importance of following knock-and-announce guidelines by adequately training their officers.
Another defense against possible abuse of the knock-and-announce requirement is officer safety. Most officers find it judicious to knock and announce their presence and intentions. “Surprise” entries can lead to misunderstanding on the suspect’s part, creating situations that can escalate into unnecessary violence.
Although the Supreme Court decision of Hudson v. Michigan is now the law of the land, it remains to be seen whether Hudson will have any significant impact on how police approach knock-and-announce situations. At a minimum, it seems clear that the decision does not relieve police from the necessity of a warrant or from the knock-and-announce requirement that accompanies the execution of a warrant.
For one thing, the constitution of any state can be interpreted by its own state supreme court in ways that strengthen the rights of defendants in knock-and-announce cases. This can vary enormously from state to state. In addition, one major question that was not reached in the Hudson case is whether intentional violation of the knock-and-announce rule by officers might result in suppression of evidence.
Tampa, FL Police Sgt. Ken Morman hopes that the decision in Hudson v. Michigan will not affect how officers in his department do their jobs. Morman, a narcotics investigator, points out that it is in the best interest of police officers to announce themselves.
With the prospect of increasing knock-and-announce violations, it is up to law enforcement management to educate both new recruits and seasoned officers in the proper way to execute warrants. In high-risk / low-frequency situations where discretionary time is limited, proper training is essential to minimize risk.
Susan Geoghegan recently graduated summa cum laude from Florida Gulf Coast University with a B.S. in criminal justice. She has previously been published in LAW and ORDER magazine and can be reached at sgeofl@earthlink.net.